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Readiness and Willingness in Suits for Specific Performance: A Holistic Test and the Limits of Interference in Second Appeals

Published , 18 min read

What does readiness and willingness mean in a suit for specific performance?

Under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, specific performance cannot be enforced in favour of a plaintiff who fails to prove that they have performed, or have always been ready and willing to perform, the essential terms of the contract that they were to perform. Readiness is the capacity to perform, including the means to pay; willingness is the intention to perform, shown by conduct. Courts assess both on the whole of the evidence.

Key takeaways

  • Since 1 October 2018, Section 16(c) bars relief to a plaintiff who "fails to prove" readiness and willingness; the earlier wording was "fails to aver and prove", and Explanation (ii) now says the plaintiff "must prove" rather than "must aver".
  • Readiness concerns capacity, including the financial ability to pay the balance consideration; willingness concerns intention and conduct, and the two are judged together on all the facts, not on one isolated circumstance.
  • A plaintiff need not show that the whole balance was held in cash throughout; the question is financial capacity at the material time.
  • A second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure lies only on a substantial question of law, so a High Court cannot ordinarily set aside concurrent findings of fact merely because another view is possible.
  • Section 103 lets the High Court decide an issue of fact in a second appeal only where the evidence on record is sufficient and the issue was not decided, or was wrongly decided because of a question of law, by the courts below.
On this page (13 sections)
  1. Introduction
  2. 1. Statutory requirement under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act
  3. 2. Readiness and willingness must be assessed holistically
  4. 3. Financial capacity and the requirement of having ready cash
  5. 4. The plaintiff’s conduct before and after institution of the suit
  6. 5. The effect of disputed additional demands and alleged non-payment
  7. 6. The limited jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 CPC
  8. 7. Recent reiteration of the principles governing Section 100 CPC
  9. 8. The scope of Section 103 CPC
  10. 9. Application of these principles in specific performance litigation
  11. Conclusion
  12. Common questions
  13. References

Introduction

The remedy of specific performance is governed by the principles contained in the Specific Relief Act, 1963. A plaintiff seeking specific performance is required to establish that the plaintiff has performed, or has always been ready and willing to perform, the essential terms of the contract which are required to be performed by the plaintiff. In other words, the plaintiff has taken all the necessary actions to complete the transactions. This requirement is embodied in Section 16(c) of the Act.

The question of readiness and willingness frequently becomes the major issue arising out of agreements to sell immovable property. Such disputes often involve questions concerning payment of the balance consideration, availability of funds, demands for additional amounts, correspondence between the parties, delay in execution of the sale deed and the conduct of the parties during the pendency of litigation.

A related and equally important question arises when the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently returned findings on readiness and willingness, but the High Court reverses those findings in a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). The jurisdiction of the High Court in a second appeal is limited and cannot ordinarily be exercised as if it were hearing a first appeal on facts.

The law therefore requires consideration of two connected principles: first, the manner in which readiness and willingness must be assessed under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act; and second, the limits within which the High Court may interfere with findings of fact in a second appeal.

1. Statutory requirement under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act

Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act provides a personal bar to the grant of specific performance where the plaintiff fails to establish the required performance, readiness and willingness in accordance with the provision.

The requirement is not satisfied merely by stating that the plaintiff was interested in completing the transaction. The plaintiff must establish, through pleadings and evidence, the ability and intention to perform the contractual obligations which were required to be performed by the plaintiff.

The assessment is not confined to the date on which the agreement was executed or the date on which the suit was instituted. The Court must examine the relevant period during which performance was required and the plaintiff’s conduct in the circumstances of the particular case.

The Supreme Court has consistently recognised that readiness and willingness are related but distinct concepts. Readiness primarily concerns the plaintiff’s capacity to perform the contract, including the financial ability to pay the balance consideration. Willingness is assessed by examining the plaintiff’s conduct and intention to perform the contractual obligations.

In N.P. Thirugnanam (Dead) by LRs v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, (1995) 5 SCC 115, the Supreme Court considered the requirement of continuous readiness and willingness as an essential condition for obtaining a decree for specific performance. Section 16(c) of the Act envisages that plaintiff must plead and prove that he had performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than those terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance.

2. Readiness and willingness must be assessed holistically

One of the important principles governing Section 16(c) is that readiness and willingness cannot be determined by applying a rigid or mechanical formula. The Court is required to consider the entire factual background, the contractual obligations, the circumstances in which performance was to take place and the conduct of both parties.

In Syed Dastagir v. T.R. Gopalakrishna Setty, (1999) 6 SCC 337, the Supreme Court explained that the requirement under Section 16(c) is concerned with the facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of concerned parties.

The same approach was considered in C. Haridasan v. Anappath Parakkattu Vasudeva Kurup, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 36, where the opinion discussed the need to determine readiness and willingness by considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, including the intention and conduct of the parties. It also recognised the distinction between financial capacity and the conduct demonstrating willingness.

The principle of holistic assessment is particularly relevant where the defendant raises isolated circumstances, such as a disputed tender of money, non-payment of an additional amount, or the absence of a particular financial document, to contend that the plaintiff was not ready and willing.

The Court must examine whether such circumstances, viewed in the context of the entire transaction, genuinely demonstrate an absence of readiness or willingness. A single circumstance should not be detached from the surrounding facts and treated as conclusive without considering the plaintiff’s overall conduct.

3. Financial capacity and the requirement of having ready cash

A plaintiff is not necessarily required to demonstrate that the entire balance consideration remained physically available in cash at every moment throughout the litigation. The relevant inquiry is whether the plaintiff had the financial capacity to perform the contractual obligation at the material time.

In Sukhbir Singh v. Brij Pal Singh, (1997) 2 SCC 200, the Supreme Court considered the requirement of financial readiness and recognised that the plaintiff’s capacity to pay is material; physical possession of cash throughout the relevant period is not invariably required.

The principle was also considered in A. Kanthamani v. Nasreen Ahmed, (2017) 4 SCC 654, and C.S. Venkatesh v. A.S.C. Murthy, (2020) 3 SCC 280. These decisions are relevant when examining whether the evidence, taken as a whole, establishes the plaintiff’s financial capacity and conduct.

It is therefore important to distinguish between a genuine inability to arrange the consideration and a mere absence of proof in the particular form suggested by the defendant. The ultimate question remains whether the evidence establishes the plaintiff’s financial capacity at the relevant time.

4. The plaintiff’s conduct before and after institution of the suit

The conduct of the plaintiff is an important factor in determining willingness. The Court may consider the correspondence exchanged between the parties, requests for execution of the sale deed, efforts to obtain permissions or clearances, tender of consideration, legal notices and the institution and prosecution of the suit.

In C.S. Venkatesh v. A.S.C. Murthy, (2020) 3 SCC 280, the Supreme Court considered the significance of the plaintiff’s conduct and the attending circumstances while examining readiness and willingness.

In Aniglase Yohannan v. Ramlatha, (2005) 7 SCC 534, the Supreme Court examined the statutory requirement in the context of the plaintiff’s conduct and the circumstances surrounding non-completion of the transaction.

The Court should therefore avoid treating the institution of the suit as the only relevant point of assessment. Equally, conduct after institution of the suit cannot automatically cure a failure to establish readiness and willingness during the material contractual period. Subsequent conduct may, however, be relevant to the extent that it sheds light on the plaintiff’s continuing intention and compliance with obligations under the contract and the decree.

Where the plaintiff has consistently called upon the defendant to execute the sale deed, taken steps to arrange the consideration, pursued the litigation and complied with directions requiring deposit of the balance consideration, these circumstances may form part of the overall assessment. Their evidentiary value will depend on the facts and the period to which they relate.

5. The effect of disputed additional demands and alleged non-payment

In specific performance disputes, the defendant may contend that the plaintiff was not ready and willing because the plaintiff failed to pay an additional amount demanded by the defendant, such as interest, expenses, charges or other sums allegedly payable under the agreement.

Such a dispute must be examined with reference to the terms of the contract and the obligations actually undertaken by the parties. The Court must determine whether the additional amount was contractually payable, whether it had become due, whether the plaintiff disputed the amount bona fide and whether the plaintiff otherwise demonstrated readiness to perform the essential obligations.

The mere existence of a dispute regarding an additional demand does not, without examination of the contract and evidence, conclusively establish that the plaintiff was unwilling to perform the agreement. At the same time, a plaintiff cannot avoid a contractual obligation merely by describing it as a disputed demand.

The proper approach is to identify the obligations under the agreement, determine when they became due and assess the parties’ conduct in relation to those obligations. The entire transaction must be considered rather than one disputed payment in isolation.

6. The limited jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 CPC

The second appeal jurisdiction of the High Court is governed by Section 100 CPC. The provision restricts a second appeal to cases involving a substantial question of law. The High Court is required to formulate the substantial question of law and decide the appeal within the limits prescribed by the provision.

A second appeal is not an additional opportunity to reargue the facts or seek a fresh appreciation of the evidence. The First Appellate Court is ordinarily the final court on questions of fact. Consequently, findings recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by the First Appellate Court cannot be displaced merely because the High Court considers another factual view to be possible.

In Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722, the Supreme Court explained the limitations governing the High Court’s jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC and the circumstances in which interference with findings of fact may be justified.

In State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Dayal, (2019) 8 SCC 637, the Supreme Court considered the scope of interference with concurrent findings and the circumstances in which such findings may be open to challenge.

In HRCEC v. P. Shanmugama, (2005) 9 SCC 232, the Supreme Court again reminded that the High Court has no jurisdiction in second appeal to interfere with the finding of facts.

Again, in State of Kerala v. Mohd. Kunhi, (2005) 10 SCC 139, the Supreme Court reiterated the same principle that the High Court is not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. The Court observed that, in doing so, the High Court has gone beyond the scope of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as early as in 1890 stated that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact, however gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be, and they added a note of warning that no court in India has power to add to, or enlarge, the grounds specified in Section 100. [Durga Choudhrain v. Jawahir Singh Choudhri, 1890 SCC OnLine PC 10: (1889-90) 17 IA 122]

The principles governing Section 100 CPC are particularly important where the issue of readiness and willingness has already been examined by both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. If both courts have considered the relevant evidence and returned concurrent findings, the High Court cannot ordinarily reassess the same evidence merely to arrive at a different conclusion.

Interference may be warranted where the findings are vitiated by perversity, are based on no evidence or inadmissible evidence, ignore material evidence, or involve an error of law of the nature contemplated by Section 100 CPC. The existence of a substantial question of law must be real and must arise from the case; a factual disagreement cannot be converted into a substantial question of law merely by the manner in which it is framed.

7. Recent reiteration of the principles governing Section 100 CPC

The Supreme Court reiterated the limits of second appellate jurisdiction in Jaichand (Dead) Through LRs v. Sahnulal, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3864; 2024 INSC 996, a decision rendered by a Bench comprising Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Hon’ble Mr. Justice R. Mahadevan.

The decision is relevant to specific performance disputes because it considered the treatment of findings concerning readiness and willingness in the context of a second appeal. In paragraphs 21 to 29, the Court examined the approach adopted by the High Court and reiterated the limitations on reappreciation of evidence under Section 100 CPC.

The judgment emphasises the importance of the findings of the First Appellate Court as the final court of fact and the need for a legally sustainable basis before those findings can be disturbed in second appeal. It also discusses the circumstances in which the High Court may determine questions of fact under Section 103 CPC.

The decision is therefore relevant where a party challenges a High Court judgment on the ground that the High Court reassessed the evidence and substituted its own factual conclusion for findings already recorded by the courts below.

It is important, however, to distinguish the factual outcome of that case from the proposition of law for which it is relied upon. The decision is relevant for the limits of second appellate jurisdiction, and its factual result should not be treated as automatically determining the outcome of another specific performance dispute.

8. The scope of Section 103 CPC

Section 103 CPC permits the High Court, in specified circumstances, to determine an issue of fact necessary for disposal of the appeal where the evidence on record is sufficient and the statutory conditions are fulfilled.

This provision does not confer a general power to reassess all evidence in a second appeal. It operates within the limited circumstances specified by the statute and must be read together with Section 100 CPC.

The discussion in Jaichand (Dead) Through LRs v. Sahnulal, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3864; 2024 INSC 996, is relevant in this regard, particularly paragraphs 27 to 29. The decision considers the statutory limits within which factual issues may be determined by the High Court in a second appeal.

Accordingly, where the High Court seeks to interfere with findings concerning readiness and willingness, it must identify the substantial question of law involved and explain how the findings of the courts below fall within a recognised ground of interference. A fresh assessment of the evidence, without satisfying the statutory requirements, would be inconsistent with the scheme of Sections 100 and 103 CPC.

9. Application of these principles in specific performance litigation

The principles discussed above have practical significance in disputes where the plaintiff’s readiness and willingness have been accepted by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, but rejected by the High Court in second appeal.

In such cases, the controversy should not be confined to whether the High Court could have reached a different conclusion on the evidence. The more important question is whether the High Court had jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC to displace the concurrent findings in the first place.

The following aspects may be relevant while examining such a challenge:

  • Whether the Trial Court and First Appellate Court considered the plaintiff’s financial capacity and conduct.
  • Whether the courts below examined the correspondence exchanged between the parties and the steps taken for completion of the transaction.
  • Whether the alleged failure to pay any amount was considered in the context of the contractual terms and the defendant’s own obligations.
  • Whether the High Court identified a substantial question of law arising from the record.
  • Whether the High Court demonstrated that the concurrent findings were perverse, unsupported by evidence, based on inadmissible evidence or otherwise legally unsustainable.
  • Whether the High Court’s conclusion was based on a permissible legal ground or merely on a different appreciation of the same evidence.

Where the concurrent findings are supported by evidence and the High Court has not demonstrated a legally recognised ground for interference, the reversal of those findings may raise a substantial question concerning the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC.

Conclusion

The legal position governing specific performance claims requires the plaintiff to establish readiness and willingness in accordance with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. This assessment must be made by examining the plaintiff’s financial capacity, intention, conduct and the surrounding circumstances of the transaction. Neither readiness nor willingness should be determined by isolating a single circumstance from the entire factual background.

At the same time, the statutory requirement under Section 16(c) must not be diluted. The plaintiff continues to bear the burden of establishing the necessary elements through pleadings and evidence. Subsequent conduct and compliance with a decree may be relevant to the overall factual assessment, but they cannot automatically substitute for proof of readiness and willingness during the material period.

Where the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently considered the evidence and recorded findings on readiness and willingness, the High Court’s jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC remains limited. A second appeal cannot be converted into a regular appeal on facts. Interference must be supported by a substantial question of law and a recognised legal basis for disturbing the findings of the courts below.

The combined effect of these principles is that specific performance disputes must be decided on a complete assessment of the contractual relationship and the parties’ conduct, while appellate intervention must remain within the jurisdictional boundaries prescribed by the CPC.

The firm’s Supreme Court practice page describes its appellate practice.

Common questions

What is the difference between readiness and willingness?

Readiness is the plaintiff’s capacity to perform their side of the contract, including the financial ability to pay the balance consideration. Willingness is the intention to perform, judged from the plaintiff’s conduct, such as correspondence, requests to execute the sale deed and steps taken to complete the transaction. Section 16(c) requires the plaintiff to prove both.

Must the plaintiff keep the full balance in cash throughout the suit?

Not necessarily. The question is whether the plaintiff had the financial capacity to perform at the material time, judged on the evidence as a whole, rather than whether the whole amount was physically held in cash at every moment.

Can a High Court reverse findings on readiness and willingness in a second appeal?

Only within Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which allows a second appeal on a substantial question of law that the High Court must formulate. Concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and the first appellate court cannot ordinarily be set aside merely because another view of the evidence is possible.

Did the 2018 amendment change Section 16(c)?

Yes. With effect from 1 October 2018, the words “who fails to aver and prove” in Section 16(c) were replaced by “who fails to prove”, and in Explanation (ii) “must aver” became “must prove”.

References

  • N.P. Thirugnanam (Dead) by LRs v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, (1995) 5 SCC 115
  • Syed Dastagir v. T.R. Gopalakrishna Setty, (1999) 6 SCC 337
  • C. Haridasan v. Anappath Parakkattu Vasudeva Kurup, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 36
  • Sukhbir Singh v. Brij Pal Singh, (1997) 2 SCC 200
  • A. Kanthamani v. Nasreen Ahmed, (2017) 4 SCC 654
  • C.S. Venkatesh v. A.S.C. Murthy, (2020) 3 SCC 280.
  • Aniglase Yohannan v. Ramlatha, (2005) 7 SCC 534
  • Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722
  • State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Dayal, (2019) 8 SCC 637
  • HRCEC v. P. Shanmugama, (2005) 9 SCC 232
  • State of Kerala v. Mohd. Kunhi, (2005) 10 SCC 139
  • Durga Choudhrain v. Jawahir Singh Choudhri, 1890 SCC OnLine PC 10: (1889-90) 17 IA 122
  • Jaichand (Dead) Through LRs v. Sahnulal, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3864; 2024 INSC 996
  • Specific Relief Act, 1963
  • Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
  • Commentary on Specific Relief Act, 1963 by Yogesh V Nayyar
  • Commentary on Specific Relief Act, 1963 by Anand and Ayer

This article is general information about the law of India as at the date of its last review. It is not legal advice and does not create an advocate-client relationship. Readers should take advice on their own facts.